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What to Say to Those Who Stay?  
Free Movement is a Human Right of  
Universal Value
Kieran Oberman
Free movement is under attack, both within Europe and at the frontier. 
Within Europe, we are witnessing Brexit, Swiss discontent with EU migra-
tion and the electoral rise of the far right. At the frontier, free movement has 
never fared well. The EU has always been something of a gated community, 
allowing insiders to move while keeping outsiders out. The only difference 
now, with wars in Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere, is the higher numbers 
seeking entry and the higher numbers dying in the attempt. How has Europe 
responded? The current drive is to reinforce the borders, while calling on 
‘safe’ third countries, such as a Turkey, to house refugees. Expect more 
deaths and more misery in the years to come.
It is a good time then to be raising Floris de Witte’s question: is free move-
ment worth defending? Like De Witte, I think the answer is definitely ‘yes’, but 
I offer a different line of argument. For De Witte, free movement is important 
in encouraging Europeans to change their values: to move away from a narrow 
concern with nations, membership and exclusion and towards a cosmopolitan 
regard for multiple identities and ‘anchorless’ belonging. While this a fascinat-
ing and original take on free movement, it seems unnecessarily complex and 
controversial. Not everyone will accept the cosmopolitan ideological stance it 
assumes and even those who do might question whether free movement is 
either necessary or effective at promoting this ideology. The argument I offer is 
simpler and, in one important sense, less controversial. It defends free move-
ment not as means to change values but rather as an extension of the values we 
already hold. It also offers reasons for why those who stay in their country of 
origin should nevertheless value their freedom of movement.
 The human right to immigrate
Democratic societies place significant emphasis on basic liberties. These 
basic liberties are protected in international law. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) lists rights to freedom of religion, expression, 
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association, marriage and occupation. These rights are essential to protect-
ing people’s personal and political liberty. In terms of personal liberty, they 
entitle people to make basic life decisions such as whom they marry, which 
(if any) religion they practice, with whom they associate, where they work 
and how they communicate. In terms of political liberty, they make it pos-
sible for people to engage in crucial political activities such as investigating 
the effects of government policies, debating solutions to social problems 
and campaigning for change.
Free movement is important because it is prerequisite to the exercise of 
these other basic liberties. People cannot worship, communicate, associate, 
marry and work freely unless they are able to move freely. Recognizing this 
fact, international law declares a right to free movement. Article 13 of the 
UDHR and Article 11 of the ICCPR proclaim a right to free movement 
within any country and a right to leave any country to go elsewhere.
There is one right, however, that is conspicuously absent: the right to 
immigrate. This is a problem since immigration restrictions, no less than emi-
gration restrictions and internal restrictions, curtail personal and political lib-
erty. When foreigners are prevented from entering a country, they are 
prevented from worshiping, communicating, associating, marrying and work-
ing within that country. Their freedom, as well as the freedom of consenting 
citizens, is constrained. Individual autonomy suffers but also democracy. In 
an age in which so many problems are international problems and the effects 
of government policies are felt globally, it is crucial that citizens of different 
countries are permitted to interact. The power of governments and corpora-
tions transcend borders; ordinary people must not be trapped behind them.
If personal and political liberty are to be sufficiently protected, immigra-
tion must be recognized as a human right. In recognizing immigration as a 
human right, we discover the full value of EU free movement. Not only does 
free movement allow EU citizens to freely interact, it also provides a model 
for the rest of the world. In time, the world can and should follow Europe’s 
example.
There are other implications that are less flattering to the EU project, how-
ever. Human rights are universal. If EU citizens have a human right to immi-
grate to other EU states, non-EU citizens do likewise. The Syrians, Afghans 
and others at the frontier must be free to enter. Refugees have a right to live 
where they choose, not just the ‘safe’ third countries to which the EU seeks to 
confine them. Indeed, all migrants have a right to migrate not just refugees.
Floris de Witte’s article thus starts out exactly right. Retired teachers, 
Romanian IT consultants, Hungarian nurses and everyone else should be able 
to make basic decisions regarding their lives free from state interference. 
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That is what is crucial. There is no need to add that free movement encour-
ages people to achieve a new ‘self-understanding’ as ‘anchorless’ EU citi-
zens. The value of free movement is both more basic and more important.
 The freedom to stay
The discussion following Floris De Witte’s article has been fascinating and 
I have learned a great deal. Let me address two points. First, it is striking 
that, in the midst of a refugee and migration crisis, the discussion should 
have focussed so narrowly on free movement within the EU. Sarah Fine is 
certainly right to remark on this, asking ‘whose freedom of movement is 
worth defending?’ If the EU is not to forever remain a gated community, we 
must not ignore the gates.
Second, a number of contributors have raised an important problem: how 
can supporters of free movement demonstrate its value to those citizens who 
do not migrate? Floris de Witte distinguishes between ‘mobile’ and ‘immo-
bile’ citizens; a distinction that Rainer Bauböck picks up on. He wonders 
how the ‘immobile’ can be won over? The problem is an important one but, 
in its general form, is far from new. A central theme of what remains the 
greatest book on the subject of liberty – JS Mills’ ‘On Liberty’ – is the prob-
lem of justifying the freedom to pursue minority options to the disinterested 
majority. The answer Mill gave then still holds true today. There is an enor-
mous difference between choosing not to pursue an option and being pre-
vented from pursuing it. In the former case, one retains control and, with it, 
the opportunity to assess how one lives in comparison to alternative possi-
bilities. In the latter case, one never makes a choice; one’s life is dictated by 
others. Consider the point in relation to freedom of religion. One does not 
have to be a religious Jew (say) to regard a state ban on Judaism as a viola-
tion of one’s freedom of religion. One’s freedom of religion entitles one to 
have the option to practicing Judaism, even if one never chooses to pursue 
it. The option is important because in having it one has a source of control 
over one’s life that is rightfully one’s own.
There is a further point to be made, however. It is not only that people 
who stay have an interest in the option of moving. People who stay are actu-
ally exercising the same basic liberty as the people who migrate: their free-
dom of movement. This point is too easily missed. People tend to assume 
that freedom of movement is all about movement, when in fact freedom of 
movement includes the freedom to stay. Freedom of movement entitles one 
to control over one’s movements. To have control, one must be able to 
decide not just where to move but whether to move. The point is not purely 
conceptual. Freedom of movement encompasses the freedom to move and 
to stay because the same set of interests are at stake in each case. People’s 
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personal and political liberty depends as much on the freedom to stay as the 
freedom to move. We cannot make our own life decisions and engage in free 
political activity unless we are free to stay and to move as we wish.
It is easy to picture the free movement debate in terms of stereotypes: the 
‘young Euro jetsetters’ vs. the ‘resentful go-nowhere locals’. It is also easy 
to assume that freedom of movement is all about the movers and offers noth-
ing to the stayers. But we need to think again. From a normative perspective, 
there is no sharp contrast. When we move or when we stay we are engaged 
in the same core activity: deciding how we spend our lives and with whom. 
Whatever choices we make, and wherever our choices take us, we should all 
be able to see how important it is that our choices are our own.
Having come this far, we can now discern something misleading in De 
Witte and Bauböck’s terminology. The ‘immobile’ category is much too 
broad. It lumps together people who, due to poverty and other social barri-
ers, cannot move with people who simply choose not to. In the case of the 
former, the correct response is to make free movement an effective rather 
than merely formal freedom by tackling poverty and other social barriers to 
movement. In the case of the latter, the correct response is to remind these 
people that they are not, in fact, immobile. They have made a choice about 
where they live and, thereby, exercised their freedom of movement. They 
should now allow others to do likewise.
Of course, providing a philosophical argument for why everyone should 
value freedom of movement is not the same as actually convincing them. 
After Brexit, the latter task appears daunting. But the problem we face is, in 
at least one sense, easier than the problem Mill faced in his day. Mill had to 
convince people of the value of basic liberties. In our day, most people accept 
the value of basic liberties; they just fail to realize their full implications.
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